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Abstract: There is currently no universally accepted general definition of logical 
constanthood. With a view to addressing this issue, we follow a pragmatist ratio-
nale, according to which, some notion can be identified as a logical constant by 
considering the way in which it is used in our everyday reasoning practices, and 
argue that a logical constant has to be seen as encoding some kind of dynamic 
meaning, which marks the presence of an inferential transition among proposi-
tional contents. We then put forth a characterisation of logical constants that 
takes into account their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic roles. What follows 
from our proposal is that logical constanthood can be best understood as a func-
tional property that is satisfied only by certain uses of the relevant notions.
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1 Introduction
Fundamental though it may be in the study of semantics, the property that en-
ables us to classify some expression as a ‘logical constant’ has proven particu-
larly difficult to pinpoint with precision. And even though it is generally agreed 
1 We are grateful to Neftalí Villanueva and the rest of the members of our research group at the 
University of Granada, for fruitful discussions that contributed to the improvement of the ideas 
presented here. We also need to thank our audience at the 12th International Pragmatics 
Association Conference, as well as Daniel Wedgwood and two anonymous referees of The 
Linguistic Review for their insightful comments. Of course, all errors remain ours. This paper 
is an outcome of the research projects Naturalismo y Pragmatismo Contemporáneos  
(P08.HUM.04099), funded by the Consejería de Ciencia e Innovación of the Andalusian Govern - 
ment, and Conceptos de orden superior: Una aproximación expresivista (FFI2010-15704), funded 
by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of the Spanish Government.
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that the set of logical constants includes at least negation, conjunction, disjunc-
tion, the conditional, the universal quantifier and the existential quantifier,2 the 
reasons for taking some notion to be included in this set are hardly ever debated 
by the contemporary semanticist who is in most cases trained to treat this set as 
pre-theoretically given, no questions asked.3 It therefore falls to the philosopher 
of logic to provide a clear-cut definition of logical constanthood, but again even 
in this domain of enquiry the situation is not as straightforward as one would 
have hoped, with various accounts approaching the issue from distinct view-
points. From all of these, invariantist definitions, of the type that Tarski (1986 
[1966]) had originally suggested and Sher (1991, 2003) currently defends, have 
attracted broad agreement among specialists. But apart from them, a number of 
semantic and functional accounts have also appeared in the relevant literature; 
Gentzen (1935), for example, and following him Hacking (1979), Peacocke (1987) 
and Dummett (1991) have put forward inferential proposals that take a semantic 
stance on the meaning of logical constants, while Warmbrod (1999: 516) has iden-
tified them by means of their role in systematising scientific theories and Gómez-
Torrente (2002, 2007) has emphasised some aspects that a pragmatic characteri-
sation should cover. In spite of all this theoretical activity, however, it still seems 
that “there is as yet no settled consensus as to what makes a term a logical con-
stant or even as to which terms should be recognized as having this status” 
(Warmbrod 1999: 503).4
A common characteristic of previous attempts to provide a definition of logi-
cal constanthood is that they are usually strongly ad hoc: the intuitive set of logi-
cal constants precedes its theoretical characterisation, and any proposal made to 
this effect has to be tested against the original intuitions about which notions are 
‘logical’ in the first place. Clearly, this methodology has generated a substantial 
2 For some, this list goes on to contain identity, membership, the lambda operator, non-
standard quantifiers, tense, modal and epistemic operators and so on. Again, if anything, the 
lack of agreement across researchers on the members of the set of logical constants shows that 
the notion of logical constanthood has until now eluded the different attempts to characterise 
it.
3 A clear example of this attitude can be found in such influential theories as Montague 
Grammar, which incorporated in its premises “all the usual notions of propositional, 
quantificational, and modal logic” (Montague 1974 [1970]: 235) assuming a priori their 
constanthood.
4 Due to space limitations, we will not go through the different available definitions of logical 
constanthood in any detail. There are several out there, but they have all been considered more 
or less defective on various grounds. The criticisms that can be addressed against them should 
be well known to specialists, but for representative discussions see Haack (1978: 3–10); 
Feferman (1999); Warmbrod (1999) and Gómez-Torrente (2002, 2007).
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amount of ground-breaking research, at least in relation to the formal artifacts 
that logicians customarily posit. However, when one enters the domain of natu-
ral  language, with its well-known ambiguities and ‘imperfections’, the extent 
to  which mathematical logic can be used as the irreducible basis of natural-
language semantics is itself debatable. As Seuren has argued,
logic cannot be the foundation of semantics, but semantics is the proper foundation of 
logic. The logical properties of the sentences of natural languages are best seen as epiphe-
nomenal on the semantic and cognitive processing of the sentences in question. They 
emerge when semantic processes and properties are looked at from the point of view of 
preservation of truth through sequences of sentences, which is the defining question of 
logic, not of semantics. (2000: 289)
Against this background, we wish to explore in this paper an alternative 
way  of dealing with the problem of logical constants: instead of attending to 
the   pre-selected group of abstract notions, we will focus on the function that 
 logical constants are expected to perform in inferences, and then investi-
gate which expressions match this logical profile. Even though this suggested 
methodology might appear to be unconventional at first sight, it squarely belongs 
to the pragmatist philosophical tradition, which seeks to connect theory and 
practice:
Reasoning cannot possibly be divorced from logic; because whenever a man reasons he 
thinks that he is drawing a conclusion such as would be justified in every analogous case. 
He therefore cannot really infer without having a notion of a class of possible inferences, all 
of which are logically good. (Peirce 1998 [1903]: 188)
As we will turn to discuss in the following section, the intuition that we wish to 
vindicate is that by focusing too much on structural features, we have forgotten 
central aspects of the original motivation that gave rise to the modern study of 
logic, and the connection of logic with the actual reasoning practices that agents 
typically engage in is a case in point. The account we will be offering is neither 
radical nor revisionist; it is what one should expect if the conception of logic that 
begins independently with Peirce and Frege is taken seriously. All too briefly, the 
general conclusion we will argue for is that, if logical constanthood is seen as a 
functional property, it is not a property of types of expressions, but of tokens. In 
this picture, the distinct terms usually discussed under the heading of ‘logical 
constants’ do not form a natural kind, i.e., there is no logically significant feature, 
from the point of view of their overall meaning, that all of them share. Even so, 
most of them have specific, inferentially valuable roles that justify their inclusion 
in a general set of ‘aids for drawing inferences’.
Brought to you by | Swets
Authenticated | 192.87.50.3
Download Date | 10/25/12 3:57 PM
628   María José Frápolli and Stavros Assimakopoulos
2  Logic and logics
Logic is customarily defined as “the most general theory of the true and the false” 
(Higginbotham 2000: 79). Nevertheless, particular aspects of what logical en-
quiry effectively involves can be found to vary from author to author, even when 
the authors in question are admittedly among the discipline’s founding  fathers.
Tarski, for example, described logic as the science of a highly abstract kind of 
truths (logical truths), whereby “one aims to establish the precise meaning of 
[logical] terms [such as ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘is’, ‘every’, ‘some’] and to determine the 
most general laws which govern them” (1994 [1936]: 17). From this perspective, 
the difference between logic and the rest of the sciences, formal or not, rests on its 
degree of generality, but apart from that, logic possesses all the features that 
characterise a scientific theory. This much should be obvious from the way in 
which Tarski eventually connected his proposal on logical constants with the 
method used by Felix Klein to distinguish between geometrical theories, and fur-
ther suggested that the very same method could be extended to cover non-formal 
realms, such as biology, physics and chemistry (1986 [1966]: 145–146).
Frege, on the other hand, may have also noted that “just as ‘beautiful’ points 
the way for aesthetics and ‘good’ for ethics, so do words like ‘true’ for logic” (1997 
[1918–1919]: 325), but he had already clarified in earlier writings that “ ‘true’ only 
makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic, since what logic is re-
ally concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in the assertoric 
force with which a sentence is uttered” (1997 [1915]: 323). From this viewpoint, 
logic is not so much of a theory like other scientific theories, but a language (a 
‘formula language for pure thought’, as the title of his Begriffsschrift has it) and 
essentially a method of discovery, which seeks to identify safe transitions from 
the point of view of truth-preservation and bring into the open all the information 
needed to draw inferences safely.
The distinction between these two conceptions of logic, which, for ease of 
exposition, we will call ‘T-Logic’ (for ‘Tarski’) and ‘F-Logic’ (for ‘Frege’), can be-
come clearer, once their connection to mathematics is contrasted. T-Logic can be 
considered without risk a mathematical discipline, concerned with structural 
properties and relations; a discipline of the same kind as geometrical theories, 
but of a much more abstract nature. F-Logic, on the other hand, is no closer to 
mathematics than it is to any other discipline, since it is essentially a deductive 
tool; a system for the representation and evaluation of inferences that has univer-
sal applicability. To put it more simply, T-Logic is a system of truths, whereas F-
Logic is an auxiliary system that does not produce truths on its own, but rather 
allows us to represent all kinds of arguments and assess them from the point of 
view of their validity.
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When we turn to particular calculi, the differences between F-Logic and T-
Logic affect the class of systems that are correspondingly considered to be logical 
calculi. The two options are to consider a calculus a logic either by attending to its 
structure or by focusing on its intended aim. As Haack discusses,
It is relevant to distinguish, at the outset, between interpreted and uninterpreted formal 
systems: uninterpreted, a formal system is just a collection of marks, and cannot, therefore, 
be identified as a formal logic rather than, say, a formalization of a mathematical or physi-
cal theory. The claim of a formal system to be a logic depends, I think, upon its having 
an  interpretation according to which it can be seen as aspiring to embody canons of valid 
 arguments. (1978: 3, emphasis ours)
Mathematical methods focus on formal aspects, and this focus can make it easy 
to forget that in logic the items that bear logical properties are propositions, i.e. 
what is said by speakers in successful speech acts with assertive character, and 
not strings of uninterpreted signs. It is of course undeniable that the discipline of 
modern logic was born from the previous enterprise of applying algebra to the 
study of natural language, thanks to the work of mathematicians, such as Jevons, 
Boole, Peano, De Morgan, Schröder and Frege (see for example Kneale and 
Kneale, 1962), but it is also true that it became the independent science it is today 
when logicians understood the previous algebraic relations not as relations be-
tween sets but as relations between truth-bearers. This step was first taken by 
Bolzano, who placed the focus of logical relations on Sätze an sich (see Sundholm 
2009), and then by Frege who placed it on judgments (see, for instance, 1967 
[1879]: 12). In fact, Frege insisted that the only relevant feature shared by his ide-
ography and arithmetic was the use of variables (Frege 1967 [1879]: 6), and con-
tinued, for several years after the publication of Begriffsschrift, to underline the 
crucial differences between his system and that of Boole (see Sluga 1987). In this 
picture, algebra represents relations between sets, which in the case of the alge-
bra of logic are seen as extensions of concepts, while logic is concerned with rela-
tions between truth bearers, which are complete judgeable contents, that is, 
propositions.
Following this rationale, which, apart from the Begriffsschrift and Haack 
(1978), can be also found in Peirce’s writings and in the work of a substantial 
number of logicians from Gentzen (1935) till today (e.g. Read 2003), we also main-
tain that, if mathematically-oriented approaches aim to be logically relevant at all 
and not only mathematically interesting, they need to provide scientific models, 
with their fully heuristic power, of the inferential patterns that connect concepts 
and conceptual contents as they are used in run-of-the-mill arguments. In this 
respect, the contrast between T-Logic and F-Logic becomes enormously relevant 
for the purpose of defining logical constants, which thus varies from the task 
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of characterising some maximally abstract objects in the type hierarchy to that 
of characterising truth-preserving links among conceptual contents. These two 
tasks are independent of each other, and so, strictly speaking, determine two in-
dependent theoretical enterprises. One of these enterprises aims at obtaining 
maximally abstract formal structures, axiomatically organised; the relevant axi-
oms being some kind of formal skeletons, ‘logical truths’, which deal with sets of 
highly abstract formal objects, ‘logical constants’. This enterprise surely belongs 
to mathematics and its objects can be safely defined by mathematical methods. 
The second enterprise, however, has a different goal: it attempts to represent 
 valid modes of reasoning, with validity rather than truth being its basic notion. It 
does not purport to identify sets of axioms but rather those transitions between 
propositional contents that are safe from the point of view of truth preservation. 
Therefore, in contrast to what happens in T-Logic, in which logical systems are 
free-standing mathematical theories, in F-Logic systems of logic are representa-
tions of ordinary reasoning on propositions or, in alternative terminologies, Sätze 
an sich, judgeable contents, what is said, judgments, thoughts, and it is such 
propositions that are the items related in valid inferences, and the arguments of 
logical constants.
3  Characterising logical constanthood
Having justified why we take the way in which agents use relevant expressions 
in  explicit arguments to be fundamental in the account of logical constant-
hood we are currently pursuing,5 we are now in a position to propose a general 
definition of logical constants that does not only take into account their well-
established logico-syntactic and semantic status, but also their functional role as 
truth-preserving links between truth-bearers.
[LC]: Logical constants are higher-order predicables whose arguments are n-adic predicables 
(n ≥ 0), i.e. concepts and propositions. They cannot be individuated by reference to extralin-
guistic entities, concepts or objects, but through the function they perform in representing 
truth-preserving inferential relations among concepts and propositional contents.
[LC] can be seen as a formulation of what we should expect a logical constant to 
be, if our preferred sense of ‘logic’ goes along the lines of F-Logic.
To possess a higher-order predicative status is what is required for an expres-
sion to be able to represent properties of and relations between concepts and 
5 For a more detailed exposition of our rationale, see Frápolli (in press).
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propositions. Familiar intuitions around logical constants, i.e. that they are 
 syncategorematic and topic-neutral expressions, have a syntactic interpreta-
tion that is answered for by this part of [LC]. The items that carry a discourse’s 
propositional content are, by definition, its propositions and the concepts they 
include, that is, the items that have a truth conditional effect, whereas higher-
order functions stand at a different level; they play their role regardless of the 
actual content of the items which are their arguments. Along these lines, the 
 syntactic claim of [LC] also explains one of the basic intuitions behind invarian-
tist approaches: that logical constants cannot be used to discriminate between 
individuals.
This widely held assumption is further captured by the semantic part of [LC], 
according to which logical constants are not referential devices, that is, they do 
not name, hence their Tractarian analysis as rules (Wittgenstein 1922: §5.2341) 
that do not represent (Wittgenstein 1922: §4.0312) and their treatment by Grice as 
expressions that carry non-truth conditional meaning.6 Building upon such intu-
itions, it seems necessary to clarify in which sense we maintain that logical con-
stants do not have a truth-conditional import to the propositional complex that 
they are part of. As it is widely held, the semantic contribution of an expression to 
the whole in which it is inserted is the effect it has on the truth-conditions of the 
whole, but in order to evaluate the relevant contribution of logical constants, we 
still need to make clear how big we take the ‘whole’ to be and how we interpret 
what it is to ‘have an effect on truth-conditions’. There are currently two promi-
nent ways of construing the notion of truth conditions. According to the first of 
them, the truth conditions of a sentence, as uttered in a suitable context, refer to 
the whole characterisation that follows:
[[s]]w, t, s. . . = 1 iff s is true in w, t, s. . .
According to the second one, the truth conditions of a sentence, as uttered in a 
suitable context, refer only to the explicitly represented content s, that is, what-
ever one has to check with respect to the indices to see whether what is said is 
true or false.7  For our present purposes, logical constants can be taken to affect 
truth conditions in the first sense, but not in the second.
Up to this point, [LC] provides some information regarding the meaning 
that a logical constant should encode, but it does so by stressing what the rele-
vant expressions do not do. Its last part aims at providing a positive answer to 
the same question by emphasising that the role of logical constants as links or 
6 For a discussion of Grice’s views on this kind of expressions, see Frápolli and Villanueva 
(2007).
7 For an illuminating discussion on this issue, see Recanati (2007: ch. 3).
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inferential transition markers has to be somehow reflected in their conventional 
meaning. Naturally, the inferential links that logic is concerned with rest on the 
relation of logical consequence, and even though each logical constant has a spe-
cific function that makes it the constant it is, if logical constants are to be thought 
of as inference markers, they all have to possess some kind of dynamic meaning; 
they all have to encode some kind of rule that invites agents to treat the surround-
ing propositions as sustaining a truth-preserving inference.8
To this effect, we can implement in our account the logical notion of implica-
tion. Implication and inference are two sides of the same coin, since by definition 
implication is the relation that holds between the premises and conclusion in 
valid arguments. From Begriffsschrift onwards, we represent it as ‘⊢’ and with the 
development of formal semantics, as ‘"’. In this respect, it roughly corresponds to 
the natural language words ‘so’, ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘then’ and the Latin ‘ergo’, 
possibly among others. The deduction theorem of first order logic [DT] shows that 
valid inferences can be represented as the validity of the corresponding material 
conditional: Be Γ the set of sentences {γ1, γ2, . . . , γn}, [DT] states that if a for-
mula δ follows from a set of formulae Γ, then the conditional that has a conjunc-
tion of the formulae γ in Γ as its antecedent, and the formula δ as the consequent 
is valid:
[DT]: If Γ ⊢ δ, then ⊢ (γ1 & γ2 & . . . & γn) → δ.
In this respect, the possibility of converting inferences into conditionals and vice 
versa appears to be all that is needed in order to maintain that the particular uses 
of the conditional that give support to [DT] mark ongoing truth-preserving infer-
ences. This comes as no surprise, since the conditional is recognised as a logical 
constant, and Modus Ponens as a rule of inference, in every logical calculus that 
has ever enjoyed any success, a point emphasised by both Frege (1967 [1879]: 7–8) 
and Peirce (1998 [1896]: 279).
From our current perspective then, it seems that the material conditional is a 
perfect candidate for logical constanthood, since it fits [LC] seamlessly; it is a 
8 The characterisation of logical constants as rules should be familiar from other philosophical 
discussions as well. Apart from Wittgenstein, whom we have already mentioned above, Ramsey 
also contended that variable hypotheticals, i.e. universally quantified conditionals, “are not 
judgements but rules for judging “If I meet a φ, I shall regard it as a ψ” (1990 [1929]: 149) and 
Ryle understood law-like generalisations as types of “an inference ticket (a season ticket) 
which licenses its possessors . . . to move from one assertion to another, to provide 
explanations of given facts, and to bring about desired states of affairs by manipulating what is 
found existing or happening” (1949: 117).
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higher-order,9 relational notion, it does not represent truth-conditionally relevant 
concepts, that is, it does not add a substantive component to what is said in the 
sense discussed above, and it indicates a truth-preserving inferential transition.
4  Truth-preserving logical constants:  
a preliminary analysis
As we have argued so far, [LC] assembles three aspects that are individually nec-
essary and jointly sufficient for characterising logical constants from the point of 
view of F-Logic. Removing some aspects of [LC] while maintaining others, we ob-
tain broader sets of expressions related to logical practice, which have higher or 
lower degrees of closeness to logical constanthood. Indeed, most expressions 
that have at times been considered logical constants have features also possessed 
by genuine logical constants, but most of them fall short of having them all to-
gether. Up to this point, we have argued that only the conditional (singular or 
quantified), and its meta-linguistic counterpart of implication, are clearly logical 
constants. Let’s now turn to see how the rest of the usual candidates of logi-
cal constanthood pan out in our account, in an inevitably brief and preliminary 
analysis.
As [LC] dictates, logical constants have to be functions; this feature rules out 
truth-values, and the universal and empty classes, which have been treasured by 
invariantists. The status of expressions as inference markers requires them to be 
higher-order; this rules out the membership relation as well as first-order identity. 
The function of logical constants as markers of inferential links between (poten-
tial) truth bearers also rules out monadic predicables, and among them, monadic 
sentential functions that act as circumstance-shifting operators, such as modal, 
epistemic and temporal operators, as well as monadic sentence-formers, such as 
monadic quantifiers.
When it comes to negation, however, it seems that, appearances aside, its 
case deserves some further thought. From a logico-syntactic point of view, 
 negation is also either a monadic sentential operator (wide scope) or a mo-
nadic  predicable-former (narrow scope), i.e., a function from predicables to 
9 In the Fregean universe, logical constants are not higher order, for propositions are saturated 
objects and properties and relations of objects are first order. But this is a technical feature of 
Frege’s logic and semantics. Today, we understand that properties and relations of concepts or 
concepts-plus-their-arguments are higher order or, to unify the treatment that [LC] proposes, 
n-adic predicables (n ≥ 0). In this sense, we follow the Peircean practice of understanding 
propositions as 0-adic predicables.
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 predicables.10 But there is still another logically important function that negation 
has: that of expressing propositional incompatibility. Given two propositions, 
one of the three following possibilities hold: either one of them entails the other 
or they are merely compatible or else they are incompatible. In this sense, propo-
sitional incompatibility can be seen as a logical relation which can be given in an 
inferential form, through the use of the conditional (or implication) and nega-
tion;  assuming that p and q are incompatible contents, this circumstance can be 
expressed by if p, then not q. In this respect, incompatibility is an irreducible 
 logical relation, whose expression requires the use of negation. So, even though 
negation is a monadic operator from a syntactic point of view, it is sometimes 
used to express an inferential relation, one of the arguments of which is im plicit.11 
In these cases, negation appears to be a logical constant in [LC]’s terms.
Turning to quantifiers, their standard understanding in logical theory is that 
they are higher-order operators that have concepts as their arguments. A sen-
tence such as
(1) a. All Germans eat sausages.
is translated into predicate logic by means of the universal quantifier and the 
conditional:
(1) b. x (x is German → x eats sausages).
This suggests that in cases like (1a) there is an implicit conditional that the logical 
translation brings into the open. This standard translation is based on the two 
following assumptions: (i) that in standard calculi quantifiers are monadic opera-
tors and (ii) that, most of the time, general thoughts of the kind encoded in uni-
versal sentences include at least two concepts. An alternative interpretation is to 
understand quantifiers as being binary operators themselves, representing some 
kind of link between the concepts involved.12 Viewed in this way, binary quanti-
10 These two options can be illustrated as follows: (a) from “John is happy” to “It is not the 
case that John is happy”, and (b) from “happy” to “unhappy”. Recall Russell’s treatment of 
‘The present King of France is bald’ (1905).
11 Implementing the Wittgensteinian distinction between saying and showing, it should be 
evident that it is possible to see and also to show that two contents are incompatible without 
using higher-order notions, but to say it requires the use of negation (as well as the 
conditional).
12 Both interpretations can be located in Frege’s writings. In (1980 [1884]), Frege treats 
quantifi ers as higher order functions that represent the size of a concept’s extension. In this 
case, their arguments are the concepts, the size of which is represented, and they are thus 
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fiers also clearly qualify as logical constants according to [LC]. Still, even if the 
preferred interpretation is the classical one, which takes quantifiers to be mo-
nadic higher-order operators, then their standing relative to [LC] would be similar 
to that of negation; they have uses in which they indicate the presence of an infer-
ential link, which can be represented by the (implicit) conditional.
With respect to more straightforwardly binary operators now, it seems that 
apart from the conditional, conjunction and disjunction are also standardly in-
cluded in the traditional lists of logical constants. Let us now briefly turn to them.
Conjunction13 is indeed a higher-order binary operator, whose arguments 
can be either n-adic predicables (n > 0) or propositions (i.e. 0-adic predicables), 
satisfying in this way the logico-syntactic claim of [LC]. However, when it comes 
to the semantic and pragmatic conditions of [LC], it seems to be running into 
problems. According to the recent treatment of and-conjunction within Relevance 
Theory (Carston 2002: ch. 3; Blakemore and Carston 2005), if its truth table ex-
hausted its meaning, the replacement of the whole conjunctive complex with a 
mere juxtaposition of the sentences it contains would not affect the information 
explicitly expressed by it. However, this is not the case, which means that the 
presence of conjunction does not only affect the truth conditions of what is said, 
but also crucially restricts the range of available interpretations. Consider the fol-
lowing examples (adapted from Carston 2002: 236):
(2) a. Mary didn’t finish her homework. She got sick.
 b. Mary didn’t finish her homework and she got sick.
(3) a. John fell. He slipped on the wet pavement.
 b. John fell and he slipped on the wet pavement.
It is clear in these examples that the juxtaposed sentences communicate essen-
tially different information from the conjoined ones. The explanation that rele-
vance theorists offer for this phenomenon is that the use of conjunction forces 
monadic functions. However, in (1997 [1892]), he also offers a different approach: “In universal 
and particular affirmative and negative sentences, we are expressing relations between 
concepts, we use these words [i.e. quantifiers] to indicate the special kind of relation” (Frege 
1997 [1892]: 187).
13 We are concerned here with the paradigm case which involves sentential coordination with 
‘and’. This argument could be expanded to include most cases of sub-sentential coordination 
too, as is obvious in cases like “John and Bill love Mary”, which can be taken to be equivalent 
to “John loves Mary and Bill loves Mary”, but it certainly does not generalise across all cases. 
For example, the utterance “John and Bill are colleagues” cannot be taken to mean John is a 
colleague and Bill is a colleague.
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two conjoined propositions to be processed as a single unit for interpretation. In 
other words, propositions connected by conjunction stop being independent 
pieces of information and become a single complex piece. Therefore, when the 
two sentences in (2a) and (3a) are juxtaposed, the second sentence is naturally 
interpreted as an explanation of the former, whereas when they are conjoined 
with ‘and’, as in (2b) and (3b), this interpretation is no longer available, and the 
hearer has to reach for an alternative one. The reason for this appears to be that 
explanations and explananda cannot be built into a unity; to perform their job 
they have to remain separate items. As Carston further discusses, the same 
 applies to a question and its answer, a claim and its exemplifications, a piece 
of  information and the evidence for it, as well as a claim and any of its conse-
quences. In light of this argument then, Relevance Theory offers a genuine reason 
to exclude conjunction from the list of logical constants in the sense favored here. 
According to [LC], in order to be able to characterise an expression as a logical 
constant, it has to be used by speakers to mark an inferential link between two 
truth-bearers. In this respect, there need to be two independent information units 
between which truth is preserved (in the positive or in the negative), and, as 
 relevance-theoretic account shows, the presence of ‘and’ specifically excludes 
any interpretation in which the two conjoined propositions can be said to stand 
in any kind of relation. Therefore, a fortiori, ‘and’ cannot be seen as marking any 
kind of transition between the conjuncts, let alone a truth-preserving one.
Interestingly enough, even classical logic offers arguments in the same direc-
tion. In logical calculi, the role of conjunction is purely syntactic: it converts two 
predicables into a single conjunctive one and two sentences into a single conjunc-
tive one. Its role cannot be dispensed with, since it is sometimes needed to make 
a conjunctive predicable the argument of a monadic higher order operator, as in 
(4a), translated into predicate logic in (4b):
(4) a. There are honest politicians.
 b. ∃x (Px & Hx).
Along similar lines, conjunctive sentences can also be the arguments of higher-
order operators, such as the conditional, in a sense in which the juxtaposition of 
the conjunctive parts cannot be. Even in this case, however, both the logical func-
tion of combining different predicables and sentences into single syntactic items 
and the pragmatic function that relevance theorists discuss block the reading of 
conjunction as a marker of any sort of transition or movement between two se-
mantic items.
Concluding our rapid overview of the way in which the traditional list of 
 logical constants behaves in our account, we turn to disjunction. Logicians have 
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traditionally considered disjunction and conjunction to be similar in many re-
spects, but when looked at from our present perspective, this turns out to be an 
illusion. As Schiffrin discusses, contrasting disjunction and conjunction,
or is an inclusive option marker in discourse: it provides hearers with a choice between 
 accepting only one member of a disjunct, or both members of a disjunct. Thus, or is funda-
mentally different from and and but because it is not a marker of a speaker’s action toward 
his own talk, but of a speaker’s desire for a hearer to take action. More specifically, or repre-
sents a speaker’s effort to elicit from a hearer a stance toward an idea unit, or to gain a 
 response of some kind. Or thus prompts the exchange of responsibility for the maintenance 
of conversation, whereas and maintains the status quo, and but returns it to a prior state. 
(1987: 181)
In line with the received view, Schiffrin considers the inclusive sense of disjunc-
tion as basic, with its exclusive use being derived from the context and the con-
tent of the disjuncts at hand. She stresses that or is a means of presenting the 
hearer with two possible lines of inference. An assertion can be seen as present-
ing information as a possible premise in further inferential moves; when two 
propositions are connected by disjunction, none of them is genuinely asserted, 
but the speaker invites the hearer to choose any one and explore what happens. 
For this reason, Schiffrin contrasts the import of conjunction, which conveys 
some information on the part of the speaker, to that of disjunction, which asks for 
a move on the part of the hearer. In both cases, and concerning their connection 
to truth-preserving inference, the speaker is presenting premises at most, not in-
ferential moves. In this respect, when disjunction works as Schiffrin explains, it 
is not a logical constant according to [LC], nor would it be if it worked as a means 
of building complex disjunctive predicables.
However, there is a sense in which disjunction presents clear connections to 
the conditional. Classical logic defines conditionals in terms of disjunction: 
‘α → β’ is treated as equivalent to ‘¬αVβ’. Even though we have not, up to this 
point, given too much weight to the interdefinibility of the classical connectives, 
since it is only informative when restricted to the truth-functional import of com-
plex sentences and says nothing about the speaker’s meaning, in this particular 
case, the interdefinibility of disjunction and the conditional touches upon a phe-
nomenon that has pragmatic roots. Theorists on conditionals have noticed this as 
well. According to Jackson, for example, “the circumstances in which it is natural 
to assert the ordinary indicative conditional ‘if P, then Q’ are those in which it is 
natural to assert ‘either not P, or P and Q’ ” (1998: 3). Therefore, a sentence such 
as (5):
(5 )  Victoria is either in the kitchen or in her bedroom.
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can be used with an inferential import that is equivalent to (6):
(6)  If she is not in the kitchen, she must be in her bedroom.
A further example is (7):
(7 )  All integers are either even or odd.
If (7) can be asserted, then the two conditionals, (8) and (9), can be deployed:
(8 )  If x is not even, then it is odd.
(9 )  If x is even, then it is not odd.
Here, the relevant aspect is still the intentions of the speaker, which the meaning 
of disjunction allows to be used as an alternative to the compound of the condi-
tional and negation. Therefore, when the intention is stressing a truth-preserving 
inferential relation, the disjunction token is a logical constant.
5  Concluding remarks
It seems that by taking logical constants to mark inferential relations and repre-
sent non-truth-conditional links between (potential) truth bearers, we have come 
up with four candidates that pass [LC]’s tests: conditional (and its meta-linguistic 
counterpart, implication), some uses of the compound of conditional-plus-
quantifiers , of disjunction and of negation. Clearly the analysis of each type of 
notion we have touched upon has hardly been exhaustive, but we hope that it has 
made clear the underlying argument that motivates our present proposal: Trying 
to organise all the expressions selected by logicians at one time or another as 
constants under a single general view has taken us to a theoretical cul-de-sac. 
A fresh look at what all of us know about logic, and at the way in which we, as 
ordinary speakers, use logical terms can open the door to the solution of a ques-
tion, that of the meaning of logical constants, which has until now proven to be 
analysis-resistant. In this regard, the account we have presented here can be best 
seen as an effort to understand what we do when we draw logical inferences as 
well as how we use the conceptual and linguistic tools involved in these practices. 
This enterprise, however, is only feasible if we pursue it on the basis of under-
standing logic as the science of truth preservation rather than as a mathematical, 
purely formal science.
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Wrapping up this paper, we would like to add a comment regarding the lin-
guistically-encoded meaning of logical terms, which we did not have the space to 
deal with here. Browsing through the relevant literature, there is an overwhelm-
ing tendency, which certainly owes a lot to Grice’s seminal argumentation (1989), 
to accept the Boolean truth-based approach as the one capturing the encoded 
meaning of expressions such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘not’, etc. The same seems to apply 
even within the cognitive account that relevance theorists propose,14 despite 
their contention that it is not important “whether a linguistic expression contrib-
utes to something with truth conditions, but rather what kind of cognitive infor-
mation it encodes” (Blakemore 2000: 464). We feel that truth tables offer little 
input by way of this aim, and much more can be accomplished if a methodology 
like the one we have used in this paper is implemented; that is, if the meaning of 
each term under question is approached functionally rather than formally. After 
all, as Carston has suggested, from a cognitive perspective, “there is no obvious 
reason to suppose, or to consider it desirable, that what natural language connec-
tives and determiners encode is identical to the context-free, truth based proper-
ties of logical operators; rather, there is some reason to expect differences in at 
least some cases” (2002: 257). Still, this is an insight that we can only hope to 
pursue in future research, that we will undertake alongside the more thorough 
exposition of the present proposal.
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